Sunday, 17 March 2013
IT dept to accept returns on 30th and 31st March, 2013
SECTION 119 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 – INCOME TAX
AUTHORITIES – INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE AUTHORITIES – ORDER FOR FACILITATING
FILING OF IT RETURNS BY TAX PAYERS FOR F.Y. 2012-13 ON 30th & 31st MARCH,
2013
ORDER [F. NO. 225/45/2013/ITA.II],DATED 13-3-2013
The Financial Year 2012-13 closes on 31-3-2013. In view of holidays on 27th and 29th of March and thereafter, on 30th and 31st March, being Saturday and Sunday it is directed that all the Income-tax Offices through out India shall remain open and the receipts counters shall also work during normal office hours on 30th and 31st of March 2013. The direction is issued for administrative convenience by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in exercise of powers conferred under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Special arrangements may also be made by way of opening additional receipt counters, wherever required on 30th and 31st March 2013 to facilitate filing of return of income and other related work of tax payers. These instructions may be given wide publicity.
ORDER [F. NO. 225/45/2013/ITA.II],DATED 13-3-2013
The Financial Year 2012-13 closes on 31-3-2013. In view of holidays on 27th and 29th of March and thereafter, on 30th and 31st March, being Saturday and Sunday it is directed that all the Income-tax Offices through out India shall remain open and the receipts counters shall also work during normal office hours on 30th and 31st of March 2013. The direction is issued for administrative convenience by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in exercise of powers conferred under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Special arrangements may also be made by way of opening additional receipt counters, wherever required on 30th and 31st March 2013 to facilitate filing of return of income and other related work of tax payers. These instructions may be given wide publicity.
Friday, 15 March 2013
Royalty is payable to State governments only on the metal content extracted
March 14, 2013:
Royalty is payable to State governments only on the metal content extracted. Tailings and rejects dumped back into the earth obviously are not metals mined and, to that extent, royalty cannot be levied on them.
This is what the Supreme Court said in State of Rajasthan and Others V. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. and Another.
The Apex court rejected the contention of the State that royalty would have to be paid on the entire quantity excavated inasmuch as processing the ore would also amount to consumption of the ore.
Therefore, even if the said ores — tailings and rejects — are not physically taken out of the leased area, the royalty will have to be paid on the contents of lead and zinc contained in the ore, the State contended.
Instead the court approved the stand of the respondent that royalty is payable only on what is taken out of the mines.
Thursday, 14 March 2013
Directors Responsibility in Cheque Bounced Cases
The Supreme Court of India in a far reaching Judgment of the Bench of Hon'ble Justice Mr Sathasivam and Mr Justice H.Dattu reported in the case of National Small Industries Corp. Ltd. Versus Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr. has dealt with the liability of Directors in Check Bouncing Cases under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
Two separate Appeals came before the Apex Court one related to National Small Industries Corp. Ltd vs Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr and DCM Financial Services Ltd., vs M/s International Agro Allied Products Ltd.
BRIEF FACTS:
National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. had filed 12 criminal complaints under Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142 of the Act against M/s Jay Rapid Roller Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, its Managing Director - Shri Sukhbir Singh Paintal, and its Director - Shri Harmeet Singh Paintal. It is the claim of the appellant that so as to make the Managing Director and Director of the Company liable to be prosecuted under the provisions of the Act, they had specifically averred in the complaint that all the accused persons approached it for financing of bill integrated market support program. It was also stated that the accused persons had issued cheques which were dishonored on presentation against which the appellant had filed criminal complaints under the provisions of the Act against all the respondents herein. It is their further case that all the accused persons accepted their liability and delivered various cheques, which are the subject matter of the present appeals.
DCM Financial Services Ltd., entered into a hire purchase agreement on 25.02.1996 with M/s International Agro Allied Products Ltd. At the time of entering into contract, the Company handed over post-dated cheques to the appellant towards payment of monthly hire/rental charges. Respondent No.1 - Dev Sarin was one of the Directors of the said Company. The cheque issued by International Agro and Allied Products Ltd. in favour of the appellant was duly presented for payment on 28.10.1998 and the same was returned unpaid for the reason that the Company had issued instructions to the bankers stopping payment of the cheque. The appellant issued a legal notice on 05.12.1998 to the Company, Respondent No.1 and other Directors under Section 138 of the Act informing them about the dis-honouring of the cheque in question. Despite the service of the notice, the Company did not make the payment to the appellant. The appellant, on 11.01.1999, filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi against respondent No.1 and others under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. By order dated 04.02.1999, the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, after recording evidence summoned the accused persons including respondent No.1 herein. Respondent No.1 filed an application before the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for dropping of proceedings against him. By order dated 08.09.2004, the Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the said application. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court for quashing of the complaint. The High Court, after finding that the averments against respondent No.1 are unspecific and general and no particular role is assigned to the appellant, quashed the summoning order insofar as it concerned to him.
The Hon’ble Court considered the Statutory position and the liability of Directors and specifically Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act .
As per the Judgment written by His Lordship Mr Justice P.Sathasivam J the following principles of Law emerge from the Apex Court for fixing the liability of Directors under Section 141 of the N.I. Act for prosecuting them for an action under under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.
(i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.
(ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
(iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by company along with averments in the petition containing that accused were in-charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
Expenditure on corporate membership of club is revenue expenditure
CIT vs. Groz Beckert Asia Ltd (P&H High Court – Full Bench)
The assessee obtained corporate membership of the Golf Club on payment of Rs.6 lakhs. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that it was capital expenditure. This was reversed by the CIT(A) & Tribunal which held that the expenditure was revenue in nature. The department filed an appeal to the High Court and relied on Majestic Auto Ltd where the High Court had held that expenditure on corporate membership is in the nature of capital expenditure. As the Bench was of the view that Majestic Auto was not the correct law, the issue was referred to the Full Bench. HELD by the Full Bench:
In order to decide whether the expenditure is a revenue or a capital one has to look at the expenditure from a commercial point of view. Not every advantage of enduring nature constitutes capital expenditure. What is material to consider is the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and it is only where the advantage is in the capital field that the expenditure would be disallowable. If the advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee’s trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee’s business to be carried on more efficiently or more profitably while leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure would be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future. On facts, the corporate membership was for a limited period of 5 years. It was obtained for running the business with a view to produce profit. Such membership does not bring into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of the business. It is an expenditure incurred for the period of membership and is not long lasting. By subscribing to the membership of a club, no capital asset is created or comes into existence. By such membership, a privilege to use facilities of a club alone, are conferred on the assessee and that too for a limited period. Such expenses are for running the business with a view to produce the benefits to the assessee. Consequently, it cannot be treated as capital asset (Otis Elevator 195 ITR 682 (Bom), Engineers India 239 ITR 237 (Del), Gujarat State Export Corp 209 ITR 649 (Guj) followed; Framatone Connector OEN 294 ITR 559 (Ker) dissented from; Majestic Auto overruled)
Wednesday, 13 March 2013
The Landowners have to no longer pay stamp duty if they retain some flats or shops after getting their property developed by a builder/developer.
CHANDRAKANT NANEKAR vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. (Bombay HC)
Dated: 1st March 2013
Recently Bombay High court heard a PIL filed by petitioner seeking a declaration that land owners were not required to pay stamp duty on flats and shops retained by them after getting their property developed by a builder/developer. The lawyer in return said that retaining some commercial and residential premises after getting your own property developed by any developer or builder cannot be treated as conveyance as envisaged under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 and therefore no stamp duty can be levied in such a transactions. Adding further he said, stamp authorities in Maharashtra were insisting that landowners pay stamp duty on premises retained by them and cited a reply received from stamp authorities at Pune said the duty as per Article 25(b) and 25(d) of the Bombay Stamp Act was payable for commercial and residential premises.
Before high court, The state government said that a circular will be issued in next two weeks Ld. AGP, submits that the Inspector General of Stamps will issue appropriate circular to all concerned to follow the legal position expounded by this Court in the above said case. That circular be issued within two weeks from today.
Tuesday, 12 March 2013
Order passed without dealing with objections filed by the Assessee is not valid
Posted In Income Tax | Judiciary | No Comments »
The passing of an order dealing with
theobjections filed by the assessee is not an empty formality. The
assessing officer has to apply his mind to theobjections raised
and has to deal with the objections in the order. This has not been
done in the present case. Consequently, order dated 28.01.2013 is set-aside.
THE HIGH
COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment
delivered on: 08.02.2013
W.P.(C)
711/2013
M/S
JAY BHARAT MARUTI
LTD
versus
versus
ASSTT.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ORS
JUDGMENTBADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
(ORAL)
This writ petition is directed
against the notice dated 30.08.2011 issued by the respondent undersection
148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as „the
said Act‟) pertaining to theassessment year 2007-08. It is also
directed against the order dated 28.01.2013 whereby the respondent has rejected
the objections raised by the petitioner pursuant to the receipt of
the purported reasons behind the proposed reopening of
the assessment for the said assessment year 2007- 08.
2. On going through the order dated
28.01.2013 we find that the same has been passed without anyapplication of
mind. To say the least, it is a cut-and-paste job. This is apparent from the
fact that the paragraph 3 is merely a repetition of the provisions of section
147 and 148 of the said Act. Thereafter, paragraphs 4, 5 upto 5.6 comprise of
quotations and extracts from Supreme Court andHigh
Court decisions. Paragraph 5.7 is perhaps a reference to the case at hand.
However, we find that the words mentioned therein could apply to any
case. It appears to be a generic paragraph which is perhaps applied by the
respondent to several such cases. In order to appreciate this fact we are
reproducing the paragraph 5.7 hereinbelow: -
“5.7 In this case, the belief of the
AO has been held in good faith and not on the basis of any rumour. In fact the
reasons for issue of notice existed at the time of issue of notice and the
reasons are genuine. They were in fact communicated to the assessee also. The
reasons recorded are quite detailed. As is evident from the perusal of the
reasons recorded, they in fact record the satisfaction of the AO that the
income has escaped assessment on the basis of the reasons elucidated
and the material on record as relied upon by the AO at the time while recording
his satisfaction that the income had in fact
escaped assessment.”
3. Apart from the aforesaid
paragraph there is no discussion of the points raised by the petitioner in
its objections. In fact, portions of the objections furnished by
the petitioner have been copied verbatim as would be apparent from paragraph 2
of the order which reads as under: -
“2. Notice u/s. 148 was issued after
recording the reasons under section 147 of the Act on 30.08.2011 and duly
served. In response to the same, assessee has submitted written submission
dated 27.09.2011 wherein the assessee submitted that the notice is illegal and
without jurisdiction. We object the reassessment proceedings. The return
already filed by u/s 139 for A Y 2007-08 may please be treated as return filed
in pursuance of the notice now received. Further, it was also requested to
enable us to make objections both on facts and in law to the proposed
reassessment, please give us reasons recorded for reopening the assessee and
also the order of sanction obtained for the purpose and on receipt of the same
we shall make detailed submission and objection, both on facts and in
law after which we wish to be heard in person for which adequate opportunity be
granted to determine the justifiability or otherwise of the action for
reassessment in terms of the decision of GKN Driveshaft Ltd. Vs. CIT (2003) 259
ITR 19 (SC) and not issue on merits be taken up for any decision before the
validity of action for reassessment is decided. The reasons recorded under
section 147 were provided to the AR of the Assessee Company. The assessee filed
an objection against the issuance of notice under section 148 vide written
submission.”
It is apparent on going through the
above extract that the respondent has not even bothered to change the
words such as “we”, “us”, etc. which the petitioner had used in
its objections/ reply. This shows that the respondent had not even applied
his mind and not even bothered to correct the contents of paragraph 2 so as to
put it into second person or third person in the grammatic sense.
4. For the aforesaid reasons, after
hearing the counsel for the parties at the stage of admission itself
we feel that such an order cannot be permitted to stand as it smacks of
non-application of mind. The passing of an order dealing with
the objections filed by the assessee is not an empty formality. The
assessing officer has to apply his mind to
the objections raised and has to deal with theobjections in the
order. This has not been done in the present case. Consequently, order dated
28.01.2013 is set-aside. The matter is remitted to the respondent to pass a
fresh order after taking into account the objections filed by the
petitioner as also after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The
order be passed by the respondent within three weeks. We have not commented at
all on the merits of this petition with regard to the validity of the notice
dated 30.08.2011. That issue is kept open. The writ petition stands disposed
of.
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